The Asbury Journal 69/2:136-147
© 2014 Asbury Theological Seminary
DOI: 10.7252/Journal.02.2014F.09

Christopher P. Momany

Faculty Psychology in the Holiness Theology of Asa Mahan

Abstract
As America awakened to a greater antislavery consciousness, Asa
Mahan, president of the Oberlin Collegiate Institute, presented his seminal
reflection on Christian Perfection. Mahan offered an unusually precise
definition of perfection or holiness. The Oberlin president borrowed from
Scottish Common Sense Realism to suggest an understanding of Christian
Perfection that was both personally rigorous and socially prophetic. This
conception of holiness was also rooted in a commitment to objective truth.
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Introduction
In her riveting narrative of Ohio’s Underground Railroad, Ann
Hagedorn writes:
Eighteen hundred and thirty-eight was the year of the great
escape of the Maryland slave Frederick Augustus Bailey, who,
dressed as a sailor back from duty at sea, fled on a train to
New York, where he changed his surname to Douglass after a
character in the poem The Lady of the Lake by Sir Walter Scott.
It was the year when Pennsylvania Hall, a large new building
in Philadelphia erected for the cause of free speech, including
abolitionism, opened with an assemblage of thousands,
including William Lloyd Garrison – and closed four days later,
after a mob burned it to the ground. And it was the year when
the government forced the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw,
and Seminole to march a thousand miles along a “trail of
tears” out of their indigenous Southeastern U.S. to land west
of the Mississippi (Hagedorn 2002: 140).

Eighteen hundred and thirty-eight was also the year that Asa
Mahan, antislavery president of the Oberlin Collegiate Institute, presented
a seminal paper on Christian Perfection. During the evening of September
4, 1838, Mahan addressed the Oberlin “Society of Inquiry” regarding
the question, “Is Perfection in Holiness Attainable in this Life?” (Mahan
1838:1). From that point forward, Oberlin’s commitment to human rights
became inextricable from its promotion of a unique holiness theology.
This integrated conviction went far beyond an application of perfectionist
ideas to social problems. Mahan articulated a very precise view of Christian
holiness. His definition of spiritual maturity demanded an unconditional
regard for the intrinsic worth of God and people.
The Case for Egalitarian Realism
Asa Mahan was born on November 9, 1799 in Vernon, New York
and thus came of age among a religious populace warmed and worn out by
revival fires. His upbringing matched the intensity of New York’s “Burned
Over District,” and he was graduated first from Hamilton College and then
Andover Seminary. In 1831 Mahan accepted the pastorate of Cincinnati’s
Sixth Presbyterian Church and also took on duties as a trustee of Lane
Theological Seminary. His staunch support for the student antislavery
movement at Lane brought both condemnation and opportunity (Madden
and Hamilton 1982: 26-51). Mahan and many of the Lane abolitionists
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eventually moved to Oberlin, Ohio. Here Mahan served as president of the
Oberlin Collegiate Institute from 1835-1850.
Asa Mahan did not take up presidential duties without
philosophical predisposition. He is best known for uniting a theology of
Christian Perfection with uncompromising social principles. However he
developed this witness against the backdrop of clear metaphysical and
epistemological commitments. From beginning to end Mahan was a realist
of the Scottish variety. His two-volume work, A Critical History of Philosophy
(1883), sorted all cognitive traditions into four basic schools: idealism,
materialism, skepticism, and realism. Mahan claimed that idealism reduces
external realities to subjective operations of the mind, and materialism
subordinates reflection to external objects. Skepticism denies knowledge in
either subjective or objective form. Only realism, according to Asa Mahan,
offers a perspective that honors both the subject and object in relations of
understanding (Momany 2005: 75-84 and Momany 2009: 142-153).
The Scottish philosophy of Common Sense was a form of realism
codified and then popularized by Thomas Reid (1710-1796), Dugald
Stewart (1753-1828), and others. Most identify its establishment in America
with the college presidency of John Witherspoon at Princeton (17681794). This perspective claimed for humanity an innate ability to know
the world as it really exists. Moreover, realists of the Scottish school held
that every human being enjoyed the intellectual capacity to conceptualize
both the self and others with remarkable accuracy. Realism was, at once, a
straightforward and demonstrably egalitarian viewpoint. It also developed
a regional flavor. Idealism held strong appeal in New England. Materialism
radiated from Philadelphia to points south. Realism was a quintessentially
middle-American philosophy, given distinctive stamp in New Jersey and
then sent west.
Asa Mahan’s commitment to Scottish Common Sense was typical
and is easily overlooked. This form of realism pervaded the frontier
expansion of antebellum higher education, so much so that it received
the scorn of more imaginative critics. By the twentieth century, Common
Sense was judged a superannuated construct possessing little vigor.
Even more generous appraisals described it as an artifact of increasingly
irrelevant religious traditions. I. Woodbridge Riley’s landmark study of
American philosophy (1907) considered the role of realism in collegiate
life and concluded that it was “an eminently safe philosophy which kept
undergraduates locked in so many intellectual dormitories, safe from the
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dark speculations of materialism or the beguiling allurements of idealism”
(Riley: 477). A nation come of age during the late nineteenth century could
not help its urbane desire to cast off shopworn epistemological habits. The
Scottish philosophy fell into disrepute.
As the twentieth century dawned more refined intellectuals
continued to distance themselves from Scottish Realism. Not until
Sydney Ahlstrom’s 1955 article, “The Scottish Philosophy and American
Theology,” did a more charitable evaluation appear (Ahlstrom: 257-272).
Ahlstrom was no promoter of naïve realism. Rather, hindsight brought a
less disdainful treatment of the movement.
Meanwhile, Common Sense Realism remained a force in certain
church circles, especially those attracted to fundamentalism. Mainline and
secular academics could appreciate Scottish thought by the 1950s, primarily
because they had not defended its assumptions for decades. Evangelical
scholars faced a unique challenge. Among conservative Protestants, the
assertions of Common Sense were alive, if not exactly well, long into
the twentieth century. George Marsden and Mark Noll have charted the
tradition’s trajectory among Evangelicalism from the Civil War to World
War II (especially Marsden 1980 and Noll 1985: 216-238). Yet they and
others have never really made up their minds whether Common Sense
proclivities deserve a residual courtesy or outright censure. By the late
twentieth century, self-conscious Evangelicals considered Scottish Realism
an intellectual embarrassment. However, this belated criticism invites its
own critique, especially since the dominant historiography has come from
Reformed church historians (Noll 1994: 83-107).
Even before most Protestant conservatives declared independence
from their cumbersome legacy, others were prepared to consider realism
anew. The publication of a two-volume work, A History of Philosophy in
America, by Elizabeth Flower and Murray Murphey (1977) introduced
an authentic appreciation for Scottish Common Sense. Flower and
Murphey acknowledged that the philosophy had long been dismissed, but
they wielded their impeccable Ivy League credentials (the University of
Pennsylvania) to register a series of “character witnesses” for realism (1997,
vol. 1: 203). As with the earlier analysis of Ahlstrom, Flower and Murphey
did not endorse simplistic theories of knowledge, but they did commend
the tradition’s more admirable qualities.
Recent scholarship has noted ways in which Common Sense was
employed by the dispossessed and marginalized. Maurice Lee’s fascinating
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study of nineteenth-century American literature and its philosophical
grounding is one example. Lee compares two of the autobiographies
written by Frederick Douglass in 1845 and in 1855. He demonstrates how
the latter version incorporates specific themes from the Scottish school that
are lacking in the first book (Lee 2005: 93-132). The second autobiography,
My Bondage and My Freedom, contains analysis similar to that of Douglass’s
colleague, James McCune Smith – a Scottish-educated physician of African
descent. Smith even wrote the preface to this second autobiography.
By 1855 Douglass insisted upon speaking for himself, not only
about his experience but most especially about the meaning of his experience.
Invoking and then deploying peculiarly Scottish notions regarding the mind,
Douglass was no longer content to narrate his victimization. He became the
proprietor of his reflection. He claimed the power of his consciousness.
When white New England abolitionists asked Douglass to present the
“facts” of slavery so that they could give it a philosophical critique, he
confronted them (Douglass 1994: 367). Douglass eventually moved from
the controlling, New England influence of William Lloyd Garrison and to
the more independent (and western) environment of Rochester, New York.
The realism of Frederick Douglass affirmed his intellectual powers; that of
Asa Mahan embraced those excluded by more fashionable philosophies.
Faculty Psychology and the Law of Love
Key to understanding the Scottish tradition is its assertion that all
people share a universal human nature. The claim that this nature provided
all with direct access to reality might be lampooned by more sophisticated
critics, but the implications regarding equality and human rights were
compelling. This latter point was not lost on Asa Mahan.
In 1846 Mahan released a most intriguing, eclectic, and evocative
article. Writing for The Oberlin Quarterly Review he gave his piece the rather
nondescript title: “Certain Fundamental Principles, together with their
Applications.” This article was really a manifesto of first principles for
human rights advocacy, as conceived by the Oberlin president. Front and
center stood the statement that all rights and interests of humanity “rest
exclusively upon the permanent and changeless laws of human nature
itself, upon the elements of humanity common to all individuals of the
race” (Mahan 1846: 228). Further on he concluded that this shared identity
is so seminal, any acceptance of its violation in a single person degrades our
own dignity (Mahan 1846: 229-230).

christopher p. momany: the holiness theology oF asa mahan

141

So just what was the Common Sense anthropology? For this
realists turned to the sub-discipline of Mental Philosophy. Accordingly,
humans were posited as beings of three distinct faculties: the Intellect
(or Intelligence), the Sensibility, and the Will (see especially Meyer 1972).
Variations on this triad abounded in antebellum America, and moral
philosophers were especially adept at bending these categories to advance
their respective theories. Asa Mahan made explicit late in life the viewpoint
he carried very early. His 1882 text, The System of Mental Philosophy, reiterates
a more-or-less typical faculty psychology. Yet one curious fact remains.
Mahan is remembered for an emphasis upon volition. His Mental Philosophy
devotes 185 pages to the Intellect, 74 to the Sensibility, and a mere 13 to the
Will (Mahan 1882).
This imbalance is more than rectified by an earlier book devoted
exclusively to the Will. His 1845 Doctrine of the Will is often cited as a classic
refutation of the determinism bequeathed by Jonathan Edwards, and some
have concluded that the book trumpets a “decisionistic” ethic (Maddox
1995/1996: 160 and Maddox 1998: 46-47). Regardless, careful readers will
detect an impressively subtle and supple faculty psychology.
Mahan granted that the Intellect and the Sensibility are dominated
by involuntary characteristics. We know that which we know and feel that
which we feel. However, the realm of action has a quality all its own. We
are not destined to act in the same way that we know or feel things (Mahan
1845: 124-129). Mahan’s explication of this peculiar freedom is open to
debate. Traditional Wesleyans might wonder whether he leans more toward
a natural ability than a gracious ability, but it is not quite fair to accuse him
of teaching a bootstrap theology. Additionally, if Mahan appears at times to
suspect the affective side of things, we might withhold our judgment until
hearing him out.
The eleventh chapter of the Doctrine of the Will is crucial. Here
Mahan addresses the relationship between the Intellect, the Sensibility,
and the Will when action is deemed morally right and when it is deemed
morally wrong. His remarks are revealing: “In all acts and states morally
right, the Will is in harmony with the Intelligence, from respect to moral
obligation or duty; and all the desires and propensities, all the impulses of
the Sensibility, are held in strict subordination. In all acts morally wrong,
the Will is controlled by the Sensibility, irrespective of the dictates of the
Intelligence” (Mahan 1845: 156). This statement may lead one to conclude
that Mahan was suspicious of all feeling, that he was some kind of rigid
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formalist when it came to ethics. Yet the real focus of these remarks is the
Intelligence. Consistent with his Common Sense tradition, Mahan trusted
humanity’s ability to know the world outside, its character, and especially its
value. In fact, his reliance on the Intellect, as opposed to the Sensibility, was
actually Mahan’s way of avoiding self-absorption. His brand of realism was
not so much an overconfident theory of knowledge as it was a reminder
that we have obligations to those around us, even when we do not feel such
commitment.
This other-directedness is given more specific articulation when
Mahan moves into a discussion of the moral law. Like most he reiterates
the teaching of Jesus regarding love of God and neighbor. However Mahan
also attempts to place this instruction in philosophical context. He pushed
himself to develop a specifically metaphysical, even ontological, principle
that captures the essence of love. His expression may not be elegant, but
it is comprehensive: “It shall be the serious intention of all moral agents
to esteem and treat all persons, interests, and objects according to their
perceived intrinsic and relative importance, and out of respect for their
intrinsic worth, or in obedience to the idea of duty, or moral obligation”
(Mahan 1845: 163). The notion of an intrinsic worth, outside of the self, is
the fulcrum around which Mahan’s entire ethic turns.
Because God and human beings are of inestimable worth, they
command our primary regard. In 1840, Mahan wrote: “If the question be
asked, why ought God to be the object of supreme regard? the answer, and
the only answer is: His intrinsic excellence is greater than any or all other
objects. If it be asked: why ought we to love our neighbor as ourselves, the
only answer that can be given is this: his [or her] interest is of the same
intrinsic value as ours” (Mahan 1840: 208). Mahan considered this axiology
an objective truth.
The Oberlin president’s 1848 Science of Moral Philosophy clarifies
the role of the Intelligence in perceiving intrinsic worth. Here he discusses
“subjective servitude” or the captivity to feelings. In contrast, Mahan argues
that people are free when they act toward objects according to “their intrinsic
and relative importance, as apprehended by the intelligence” (Mahan 1848:
307). If subjective servitude entails being driven by the Sensibility, then an
affirmation of intrinsic worth, as known by the Intelligence, promises true
liberty.
Mahan’s faculty psychology provided much more than a
variegated theory of action. It grounded his entire pedagogy. The free and

christopher p. momany: the holiness theology oF asa mahan

143

educated person was characterized by an ordered Intelligence, Sensibility,
and Will. Mahan gave intricate expression to this view when he said:
The great want of universal humanity is a knowledge of
truth, and a state of feeling and action in harmony with truth
manifested to the mind. To this great end all the mental powers
are, as designed by the Creator, in fixed correlation. The
intellect is adapted to one result – the discovery and retention
of truth, and its presentation to the heart. The exclusive sphere
of the Will is perpetual action in harmony with truth known,
and the continued employment of the intelligence in the
discovery of the unknown; while the equally exclusive sphere
of the Sensibility is to delight in the former, and through the
influence of desire to impel the Will in directing the Intellect
in search of the latter. The true idea of education is mental
development in fixed correlation to this great end (Mahan
1846: 234-235).

This text invites several observations. Perhaps most important is its holistic
character. To consider these words is to ponder an integrated, even symbiotic
type of faculty psychology. For instance, the Sensibility seems to receive
greater recognition here. Was the college educator simply inconsistent? No.
He appreciated the affective more than most contemporary commentators
grant, but the delight involved was a joy in the presence of truth. Always
the realist, Mahan began and ended his reflection with a respect for the
value of things as they are.

Holiness as Delight in Truth
It is perhaps ironic that Mahan titled his groundbreaking 1838
essay, “Is Perfection in Holiness Attainable in this Life?” Much of the
ensuing Holiness Movement would be preoccupied with this question. It
can be argued that more energy has been expended debating the attainability
of Christian perfection than defining what is meant by Christian perfection.
The latter issue was exceedingly important to Asa Mahan.
The best known expression of Mahan’s holiness teaching is
his 1839 Scripture Doctrine of Christian Perfection. The book begins with a
chapter on the “nature” of Christian perfection. Mahan links his definition
of holiness to a healthy interaction of the mental faculties. Within the
sanctified person, the intellectual powers will seek “the truth and will of
God, and by what means we may best meet the demands of the great law
of love” (Mahan 1839: 14). Likewise, the feelings and susceptibilities will
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be “in perfect and perpetual harmony with the truth and will of God as
apprehended by the intellect” (Mahan 1839: 15). Mahan employed a faculty
psychology in his very early articulations of holiness theology.
An even more detailed explication of the role faculty psychology
played in Asa Mahan’s holiness teaching can be found among his handwritten,
manuscript notebook. After various lecture outlines, sermon ideas, and
philosophical musings, Mahan explored the topic of “Sanctification” with
reference to the mental faculties. Underscoring these notes is a connection
between the conception of Christian perfection and that of “truth.” Mahan
referenced John 17:17, as translated by the KJV: “Sanctify them through thy
truth” (Mahan, “Manuscript Writings, Miscellaneous”). Whether Mahan’s
interpretation of “truth” is the same thing intended by the writer of the
Fourth Gospel can be argued. Yet truth, in some expression, anchored the
Oberlin president’s approach to holiness, just as it figured prominently in
his faculty psychology.
A considerable part of Mahan’s emphasis on truth can be
traced to his belief in a knowable, objective reality. These same notes
on sanctification stress that the holy person is one whose intention “will
be in perfect harmony with the nature, character, and relations of all
objects apprehended by the intelligence” (Mahan, “Manuscript Writings,
Miscellaneous”). Moreover, one’s “feelings will correspond with the nature
of the objects presented” (Mahan, “Manuscript Writings, Miscellaneous”).
The interaction between Asa Mahan’s faculty psychology and his theology
of holiness is so complete that it is virtually impossible to extricate one
from the other.
While some might question the role played by the Sensibility in
Mahan’s holiness teaching, others may find his focus on the world outside
refreshing. There is nothing in Mahan’s witness that deprecates “heart”
holiness, but there is plenty to keep us from turning the tradition into
incessant navel-gazing. This might be Asa Mahan’s most powerful and
enduring contribution. It might also be an incisive gift for today’s church.
Popular religious language these days is all about “passion” –
how to find your passion, how to live your passion, how to maintain your
passion. Not surprisingly, this terminology differs little from that celebrated
in the rest of American culture. We might note that one university with a
reputation for releasing annual lists of overused and clichéd terms opened
2013 with a ban on the word: “passion” (Patterson 2012). Such self-anointed
policing of the language could be nothing further than hype and bombast
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generated by the culture it seeks to correct, but there may be something to
the indictment.
I work with young adults as a college chaplain and as a
professor. My scholarship needs to intersect with the deepest yearnings
of undergraduates. My student friends might seem to want outlets for
their constructive passion, and to a significant degree, they do. However
I have been astounded by the ways in which they want more than
passion. They want truth – truth in all of its forms. They want something
substantial enough to sustain them when their short-lived desire fails.
They want something eternal and beautiful that can orient their delight
and joy. They want holiness that will leave them with more than a warm
feeling. They want a holiness that will point them toward God and other
people. Here is where Asa Mahan’s theology has much to offer us today.
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